Occupiers' grouping in Ukraine exceeds 400,000 - expert

On 24 February 2022, a 180,000-strong group of Russian occupation troops (ROT) invaded Ukraine. According to a statement by a representative of the Defence Ministry's GUR, Andrey Yusov, made on 23 October, the grouping of ROTs in Ukraine exceeds 400,000. This is the subject of a piece by military and political observer Oleksandr Kovalenko for OBOZ.UA.

The grouping has grown more than 2 times, but as a result, the battles are not for regions and cities of millions, but for villages and small towns.

The grouping of ROTs in Ukraine has been growing steadily throughout the entire period of full-scale war. In the spring of 2022 it totalled 200,000 people, by the end of 2023 it was approaching 300,000. In April 2023, the number of ROT in Ukraine was estimated at 350 to 370 thousand, and now it is over 400 thousand.

The Russian command is purposefully increasing the number of its troops in Ukraine, using many tools of a repressive nature.

If we make a rough calculation, having to date losses of more than 310 thousand, the ROT completely nullified them by "partial" mobilisation of 300 thousand. In turn, from March 2022 to November 2023, excluding September, October and November 2023, Russia was able to mobilise from 360 thousand to 450 thousand. And let's not forget about the primary grouping of February 2022, - writes the expert.

According to Kovalenko, these rather simplified, but thanks to what very clear calculations show that quantitatively there is nothing strange in the presence of such a grouping of RWO in Ukraine. Again, this is a deliberate saturation of the combat zone with human resources by the Russian command.

What achievements do the Russian occupants have thanks to the intensification of mobilisation processes, especially since the second half of 2022?

The offensive on Bakhmut was delayed for more than 10 months. At the same time during the offensive on Bakhmut and the presence in the BD zone already at that time about 250 thousand troops, the ROV fled from Kharkiv region and then from the right-bank Kherson region.

In 2023, the Russians:

• are struggling to hold their defences in Zaporozhye oblast;
• are losing control of the southern sector near Bakhmut;
• cannot realise an offensive along the Liman-Kupyansk axis;
• are experiencing a number of problems on the left bank in Kherson Oblast;
• for more than a month, several general armoured armies, an army corps and a tank division have been trying to encircle the small town of Avdeevka.

A mobilised person will never be better than a professional military man, being together with him in the same conditions and getting the same experience. Because a professional military man will a priori know and know how to do more than a mobilised one," the expert believes.

The Russian army units that invaded Ukraine in February 2022 had almost full staffing. They had no problems with providing troops with ammunition, fuel and lubricants, and no shortage of equipment. Now the deficit in the Russian troops has become a parable and has a direct impact on the capabilities of the troops.

According to the expert's calculations, 450 thousand occupants are rounded up to 560 BTGR. At the same time, their full staff complement of tanks is 6,160. That is, the deficit of tanks for such a number of troops is 2.5, and if in percentages, the ROV are now staffed with tanks only by 40%.

To understand the situation, let me explain that a classical unit loses its combat capability and cannot effectively fulfil combat missions if losses in personnel and equipment reach 30%. In this case, we are not talking about a shortage of 30 per cent, but only 30 per cent of the technical component," Kovalenko writes.

The Russian command is systematically saturating the combat zone in Ukraine with human resources, without being able to provide them with everything they need according to their regular requirements. That is why the effectiveness of a grouping of more than 400 thousand is much lower than the effectiveness of a 180 thousand grouping.

Such a grouping does not have the ability to carry out large-scale offensive operations on a wide front, but is capable of either slowing down the offensive of the Ukrainian Defence Forces, using the quantitative factor, or organising offensives in small locations - and even then with very dubious results.