Ukraine and its European neighbors: between fear, benefit and solidarity

However, new logistical routes, intensified military production, and anticipation of Ukraine's accession to the EU are increasing interconnections with the region's countries. And, as it seems, contribute to their economic development. Socportal asked experts to talk about these processes on the example of Slovakia, Romania, and Poland.

Bratislava is not Moscow? Robert Fico's paradox

One should distinguish between the outright anti-Ukrainian rhetoric of Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico, which, among European leaders, is surpassed only by Hungarian leader Viktor Orban, and real actions, insists Adam Novak, a researcher of Eastern European economic history from Bratislava.

Fico provides Moscow with diplomatic cover and claims “pacifism” while presiding over unprecedented arms exports to Ukraine, he says.

Slovak arms exports exploded to €1.15 billion in 2023—a tenfold increase from 2021's €100 million, representing 1.1% of GDP. Private companies produce Zuzana 2 howitzers and hundreds of thousands of 155mm artillery shells annually—precisely what Ukraine desperately needs. Defence Minister Kaliňák cynically admitted: "We would not restrict defence companies because we need economic growth." Slovakia secured €92 million from Denmark, Germany, and Norway for 16 howitzers for Ukraine—the largest contract in Slovak arms industry history, the researcher notes.

According to Adam Novak, the EU, and NATO framework significantly limits Fico. Slovakia must participate in a $50 billion EU fund for Ukraine, hosts more than 1,200 NATO troops, keeps defence spending at 2.3% of GDP, and had to lift its veto of the 18th sanctions package. And while Fico regularly declares the need to withdraw from these alliances, this is not actually happening. The main purpose of this is to play on the protest mood of Slovak society.

Only 40% of Slovaks now blame Russia for the invasion, down from 51% a year earlier. Some 69% believe military aid "provokes Russia and brings Slovakia closer to war." Support for Ukraine's EU and NATO membership stands at just 30%—the lowest regionally. Over 44% believe Ukrainian refugees make the country worse—the highest EU resentment level, the researcher emphasises.

However, Adam Novak insists that this is not an indication of the Slovaks' commitment to Russia. Such an approach is rather anti-Western. It is a reaction to joining NATO without a referendum, austerity measures, and the lingering effects of the 2008 financial crisis on ordinary people.

Russian disinformation exploits this vacuum, but the root causes are real economic and democratic deficits, the expert believes.

In his opinion, public attitudes can be changed. Support for NATO rose to about 70% in early 2024 after falling to 58% in 2023.

And the mass protests in early 2025, triggered by Fico's visit to Moscow, were among the largest in Slovakia's history.

Ukrainian President Zelenskyy's message "Bratislava is not Moscow. Slovakia is Europe" resonated with protesters. Opposition parties now lead in polling. However, these demonstrations largely attract conservative and liberal supporters. The left's absence creates a dangerous vacuum—without progressive alternatives addressing economic grievances, the debate traps between neoliberal 'Atlanticism' and nationalist 'sovereignty', notes Adam Novak.

A bridge, not a terminus: what co-operation with Ukraine means to Romania

In May 2025, the Romanians elected a new president, and remained the only EU neighbouring country with Ukraine-friendly rhetoric. Before the Russian invasion, relations between the countries were rather cold. For a long time, historical continuity was evident, as the Soviet Union was wary of its southern neighbour, said Romanian political scientist Claudiu Crăciun.

After the invasion, everything changed because Romania recognised in Ukraine's response the same struggle for independence from Russia that marked its own history, he says.

The large number of refugees reinforced this bond, he says, as Romanians saw the human cost of the war and expressed solidarity with the victims. This is also being converted into a political choice for Romanians, despite the activity of pro-Russian forces. According to him, among them, there are marginal ultra-conservative currents, oriented more towards religious Orthodox identity. However, more massive and organized pro-Russian forces are rather close to Slovak forces and seek more autonomy within Europe rather than being part of the “Russian world”.

It is a historical fear of Russia and its influence, a sentiment shared by both elites and citizens. If successful in its war, Russia will become a de facto neighbour of Romania in the Black Sea, the expert says.

At the same time, he believes there is another reason for the significant solidarity with Ukraine.

Romania's political and economic status was, until now, similar to an end-of-the-line train station at a border. More risky and less stable than more central European countries, it was a laggard in development. If Ukraine becomes stable, democratic, and developed as part of the EU, presumably, Romania is not the end of the line; it is becoming a bridge, the political scientist notes.

The metaphor of a “bridge” is already manifested in quite real projects. For example, large-scale plans to reconstruct the port of Constanta, which is crucial for the transit of Ukrainian and international goods, a bridge across the Tisza that is being repaired, a railway link between Kyiv and Bucharest is being developed, and the construction of a motorway. Also, Romania exported electricity to Ukraine during the blackouts.

Regarding military support, Claudiu Crăciun says Russian propaganda is actively frightening Romanians with militarization, spreading rumours of a general mobilization or the dispatch of Romanian troops to Ukraine. Therefore, the Romanian government is attempting to “demilitarize” the public sphere and remains silent about any military supplies to Ukraine.

Which, in my opinion, is wise, given the fact that there is a Russian disinformation machine that uses everything to create fear, such as footage of military convoys, the expert said.

Should Ukrainian refugees benefit Poland?

Ukrainian-Polish relations have undergone some of the most dramatic changes during the Russian invasion, from a surge of solidarity and support to outright hostility. The current situation was consolidated by the victory of a conservative president who actively appeals to the complex historical themes in the relations between the two countries. Karol Nawrocki, elected in August 2025, has yet to meet with Zelenskyi.

The situation has changed a lot in the last three years. And what used to be marginalised now exists openly. It is a bad attitude towards Ukrainians or even outright hatred. Ukrainians in Poland say that there is hardly a day when they don't hear something unpleasant on the street or someone looks at them with hostility, says Ignacy Jóźwiak, a migration researcher at the University of Warsaw.

According to him, apart from appealing to historical contradictions, the information space also often discusses the topic of Ukrainian grain, which was mostly transited, or competition from Ukrainian transport companies for Polish firms, which are in fact monopolists of international transport. Yet little is said about Polish companies planning to invest in reconstruction projects in Ukraine —the annual Ukraine Recovery Conference in 2026 will be held in Warsaw. And, in fact, about Russia itself as the main threat. Which, however, contrasts with the fact that Poland is quite actively militarising (but unlike Slovakia does not export its own weapons to Ukraine, but is a hub for Western arms transfers). The main focus is on Ukraine and Ukrainian refugees, who are accused by the right-wing political spectrum of ingratitude and “eating up” Polish resources.

Despite this, economically, Poland benefits from the integration of a significant proportion of Ukrainians on the labour market, says Marta Nowak, co-host and author of the programme “What is it?” ("Co to bedzie") in Gazeta.pl.

The integration of Ukrainian migrants into the Polish labour market has been very smooth. According to a study by Deloitte for UNHCR (which was widely quoted after President Karol Nawrocki put forward the idea of cutting child benefits for unemployed Ukrainian citizens): currently 69% of working-age Ukrainians living in Poland are employed, compared to 75% of Poles. This is a surprisingly small gap, considering the fact that a great part of Ukrainian migrants only arrived to Poland in the last 3.5 years and many of them are mothers raising children. In 2024, Ukrainian citizens helped generate 2.7% of Poland's GDP. They increased Polish budget revenues by over PLN 15 billion, Marta Nowak said.

These figures, she says, in no way support the anti-Ukrainian narratives of the Polish right-wing. Ignacy Jóźwiak also agrees that such data can be used to expose the outright lies of the far-right.

But I personally see the danger of such a narrative associated with the dehumanisation of migrants, albeit positive. We can say that Ukrainians and other migrants are useful to our economy, they give more than they take. But if we imagine that we are talking about a person who cannot work? For example, Ukrainian pensioners, of which there are many in Poland, or single mothers with many children?, the researcher notes.

The government's decision to tie child benefits to employment was, in his opinion, one of the consequences of this attitude towards Ukrainians forced to flee the war.

Supporting refugees should not be about profit. For me personally, as a migration researcher and someone who has a positive attitude towards migrants and Ukrainian society, this narrative is very problematic. Because support and solidarity should be for everyone who needs it, not based on the fact that the receiving society has some benefit from it, says the Polish researcher.

In the end, despite the differences in policies and rhetoric, Slovakia, Romania, and Poland remain part of a common European space increasingly intertwined with Ukraine. For some, partnership with Kyiv is an economic opportunity, for others, a question of security or historical identity. Russia's war against Ukraine has fundamentally changed regional politics and will shape it for years to come. The great victory in this complex process will be the continued ability of society to stand in solidarity.

We would like to remind, that on November 15-16, the Ukrainian magazine «Commons» will hold an online conference «In Search of Europe», which will discuss over two days:

• the participation of trade unions and public movements in democratic procedures;
• new and old borders of the EU and challenges of migration;
• growing influence of far-right parties and threat of authoritarian turn;
• green transition, environmental policy and social cost of climate reforms.

The event will be held online, registration for the relevant panels can be done via the links above.

As previously reported by Sotsportal, Russia's war against Ukraine not only changed the balance of political forces in Eastern Europe but also raised questions about the very nature of Russian power. Modern Russian ideology combines contradictory elements of the legacy of the USSR and the Russian Empire. This eclectic construction, with which Vladimir Putin justifies aggression against Ukraine both domestically and internationally, is far from historical truth. The notorious interview with Tucker Carlson was a manifestation of this distorted view of himself and the world. However, regardless of the assessment of real effectiveness, this contradictory narrative still remains the main tool for internal mobilization of the Russian population and legitimization of the war for the outside world. In particular, and perhaps most of all in the countries of Eastern Europe, the relations with which will be described above. Soсportal writes in more detail about the nature of modern Russian ideology.