Mysterious GPS disruptions in Europe have been linked to Russian satellites

GNSS is the collective term for satellite navigation systems, including GPS, Galileo, GLONASS and BeiDou. In everyday language, people tend to say ‘GPS’, but for aviation, shipping, logistics and precise timing, the entire satellite navigation infrastructure is important.

Details

The study focuses on unusual interference events recorded between 2019 and 2026. According to the authors, these incidents affected ground-based GNSS stations across large areas — in Europe, Greenland and Canada. Such events were brief: they usually lasted less than 10 seconds, but during that time they drastically degraded signal reception quality.

It is particularly significant that the interference affected the GPS L1 band. This is one of the key frequencies used by civil aviation, shipping and precise timing systems. The authors explicitly note that powerful interference of this scale in this band is a cause for serious concern.

The researchers used data from a network of ground-based GNSS stations. They looked at where and when the signal-to-noise ratio dropped simultaneously — in simple terms, how sharply the receivers ‘lost’ signal quality. If a similar drop occurred simultaneously at several stations, this was considered a wide-area interference event.

In total, the authors identified 75 days on which at least one strong, short-lived event was recorded on the GPS L1 frequency. The earliest such interference events in the analysed dataset date back to October 2019. The researchers also noted that the events occurred more frequently on working days and during working hours (UTC), which, in their view, points to human involvement rather than a completely random natural phenomenon.

To identify a possible source, the team compared data from ground stations with orbital catalogues. Put simply, it works like this: if the interference is visible simultaneously at different locations, it is possible to estimate where the signal might have come from, and then check which satellites were in the right position at that moment.

In one of the cases examined in detail, the analysis pointed to the Kosmos-2546 satellite. However, the authors emphasise that it could not explain all the events: this satellite was only launched in 2020, whereas the interference was recorded as early as 2019. The researchers therefore draw a broader conclusion: the likely source may not have been a single satellite, but the Russian early warning system, the Unified Space System, comprising several satellites in highly elliptical ‘Molniya’-type orbits.

Put simply, the researchers are not claiming to have found ‘a single satellite that was always jamming GPS’. Their theory is more complex: a series of similar brief jamming events could have originated from a group of Russian satellites passing over the Northern Hemisphere.

Why this matters

Satellite navigation has long been part of critical infrastructure. It is needed for more than just maps on a phone. GNSS is used by aircraft, ships, rail and energy systems, financial networks, telecommunications and precise timing services.

European aviation regulators already regard GNSS jamming as a growing problem. In March 2026, EASA and EUROCONTROL published a joint action plan for the safe operation of aviation during such events. The document states that GNSS interference has become a regular occurrence, particularly on the fringes of conflict zones, and poses a threat to safety, although aircraft can continue to fly without GNSS.

The novelty of the preprint lies in the fact that it considers not the usual ground-based jamming, but a possible space-based source. If this interpretation is confirmed, it would signify a more complex level of threat: a signal from space could potentially cover vast territories.

Background

There are various types of satellite navigation interference. Jamming is the suppression of a signal, where a receiver is prevented from receiving a normal navigation signal. Spoofing is the substitution of a signal, where the system may receive false coordinates or time. In both cases, the consequences can be serious, particularly for transport and critical infrastructure.

In recent years, reports of GNSS jamming have become more frequent, particularly in areas near military conflicts. However, most such incidents are attributed to ground-based or near-ground sources. The authors of the new preprint believe that the series they describe is different: the jamming was brief, powerful, synchronised over long distances, and could not be explained by a single ground-based source.

This is precisely why they consider a possible space-based source to be particularly significant. In their view, if such events were deliberate, this could signify a qualitative escalation in the field of satellite navigation jamming.

Source

Preprint: Zachary L. Clements, Argyris Kriezis, Todd E. Humphreys, Chasing Lightning: Detecting, Characterising, and Identifying a Powerful Space-Based GNSS Interference Source, arXiv, 2026.